How Vivendi Is Expanding Its Media Empire Beyond Europe
European media groups usually expand by buying audiences they already understand. Vivendi's most interesting international position was built in markets most of its peers never entered.
Vivendi spent two decades assembled and disassembled in public, and the 2024 separation of its main businesses did something useful for anyone trying to read its strategy: it removed the conglomerate framing. What is left is a set of companies with separate international logics, and only some of those logics survive contact with markets outside Europe.
What actually travels
Pay television travels. Canal+ is the piece with a genuinely international footprint, and the part of it that matters strategically is not the French core. Operations across francophone Africa and other international markets give the business subscriber growth that its home market cannot supply, in territories where pay television penetration is rising rather than declining.
Advertising travels, but not the same way. Havas internationalises because its clients are international. An agency network expands where advertisers require presence, which makes its international footprint a function of client demand rather than an independent bet on a market.
Publishing barely travels at all. Books are a language business with national distribution, retail relationships and cultural specificity. A French publishing group does not become a global one by opening offices; it does so by acquiring in other languages, which is a different and slower proposition.
| Business | How it internationalises | Constraint |
|---|---|---|
| Pay television | Direct operations and local partnerships | Regulatory and political exposure per market |
| Advertising | Follows global client requirements | Growth capped by client rosters |
| Publishing | Acquisition in other languages | Slow, expensive, culturally specific |
| Investment holdings | Capital allocation | Not operational scale |
Why Africa carries more weight than its revenue share
African pay television subscribers are worth less individually than European ones, and coverage tends to price the business accordingly. That underweights three things.
First, direction. European pay television is a mature category managing decline against streaming; several African markets are still adding first-time subscribers. A business with one segment shrinking and another growing has a different profile from one that is simply shrinking, and equity markets price that difference.
Second, competitive position. The global streaming services that reshaped European television have been slower and more cautious in these markets, where payment infrastructure, bandwidth and content localisation are harder. An operator that solved local distribution and payments holds a position that is not trivially attacked.
Third, content leverage. Sports rights and local production acquired for African markets have limited value to a competitor without the distribution to exploit them, which makes the combination more defensible than either part alone.
Where the strategy strains
- Political and regulatory concentration. Operating pay television across many jurisdictions means licensing, content regulation, currency controls and repatriation risk in each. This is a materially different risk profile from European operations and it does not diversify away.
- Currency. Revenue collected in currencies that can depreciate against the reporting currency turns subscriber growth into flat euro revenue, which is a recurring feature rather than an occasional shock.
- Content cost in local terms. Sports rights inflate globally while local pricing power does not follow, compressing margin in exactly the markets where growth is coming from.
- The split removed the cross-subsidy. Standalone businesses cannot fund a long international build from another division's cash flow, which sharpens capital discipline and shortens patience.
What it means for European media generally
The generalisable point is not about one group. It is that the parts of a European media business that internationalise successfully are the ones selling something a market cannot supply for itself, rather than the ones exporting European content to audiences assumed to want it.
Distribution, infrastructure and aggregation travel because they are capabilities. Editorial and cultural products travel poorly because they are specific to the market that produced them. European groups that expanded on the first logic have generally done better than those that expanded on the second, and the difference shows up years later in whether the international division is a growth story or a write-down.
For anyone reading European media strategy, that is the useful test to apply to any expansion announcement: is the group selling a capability, or exporting a product?
Note on data. Corporate structures in this sector change frequently through spin-offs, disposals and shareholder action, and segment reporting differs between periods and entities following a separation. Subscriber figures across territories are reported on varying bases. Verify current group structure and the most recent reported figures before relying on any description of holdings.
The MultiChoice acquisition: the expansion made concrete
Everything above is strategy. In September 2025 it became a balance sheet. Canal+ completed its acquisition of MultiChoice, the South African pay-television group behind DStv, Showmax and SuperSport, in a transaction valued at around R55bn. South Africa's Competition Tribunal had cleared the deal in July 2025 subject to conditions on local ownership, employment and content investment — the price of allowing a foreign buyer to take control of a nationally significant broadcaster.
The scale change is the point. MultiChoice brought roughly 19.3 million subscribers as at March 2025; the combined group is reported to serve more than 40 million subscribers across close to 70 countries in Africa, Europe and Asia. For a company that was carved out of Vivendi only nine months earlier and listed in London, that is a remarkably fast redefinition of what Canal+ is: no longer a French pay-TV operator with African interests, but an Africa-weighted group with French origins.
Two consequences follow. First, negotiating power: a buyer with 40 million subscribers argues differently with Hollywood studios and sports federations than one with 26 million. Second, exposure: the subscriber base is now concentrated in currencies and economies that behave nothing like the French market, and the conditions attached by the Tribunal constrain how much of the cost base can be moved. The expansion is real, and so is the risk that comes with it.
Sources
The claims in this article rest on the documents below. Each is linked to what it establishes, so you can check any statement against its origin rather than taking ours for it.
- Daily Maverick, on Canal+ completing the R55bn MultiChoice deal — the single largest step in the expansion this article describes, closed in September 2025
- Business Report, on the Competition Tribunal decision — the conditions South Africa attached before allowing foreign control
- Vivendi, listings of Canal+, Havas and Louis Hachette Group — the December 2024 separation that made this expansion a Canal+ decision rather than a Vivendi one
- Vivendi, 2024 annual results following the spin-off (PDF) — what remains inside Vivendi itself after the three businesses left
Frequently asked questions
What does Vivendi own internationally?
Following the 2024 separation of its main businesses, the international footprint sits primarily with pay television operations spanning France, francophone Africa and other markets, alongside an advertising network that follows global client requirements and publishing assets that remain largely language-bound.
Why does African pay television matter to a European media group?
Because of direction rather than size. European pay television manages decline against streaming while several African markets still add first-time subscribers. A business with a growing segment has a different profile from one that is simply shrinking, and that difference is priced.
Why have global streaming services been slower in these markets?
Payment infrastructure, bandwidth cost and content localisation are all harder there than in Europe. An operator that has solved local distribution and payments holds a position that is not trivially attacked, which is the main competitive advantage in the category.
What is the biggest risk in this international strategy?
Concentration of political and regulatory exposure. Operating pay television across many jurisdictions means licensing, content rules, currency controls and repatriation risk in each, and currency depreciation can turn subscriber growth into flat reported revenue.
What is the general lesson for European media expansion?
The parts that internationalise successfully sell a capability a market cannot supply for itself — distribution, infrastructure, aggregation. The parts that export European editorial or cultural product to audiences assumed to want it generally do not, and the difference shows up years later.